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CITIZENS UNITED AND THE CORPORATE FORM
REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH*
In Citizens United vs. FEC, the Supreme Court struck down a Federal
statute banning direct corporate expenditures on political campaigns. The
decision has been widely criticized and praised as a matter of First Amendment
law. But it is also interesting as another step in the evolution of our legal views
of the corporation. This Article argues that by viewing Citizens Unitedthrough
the prism of theories about the corporate form, it is possible to see that the
majority and the dissent departed from previous Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the First Amendment rights of corporations. It is also possible to then predict
what arguments can be expected next.
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INTRODUCTION

In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court struck down a
Federal statute banning direct corporate expenditures on political
campaigns. 2 The decision has been both widely criticized and praised as
a matter of First Amendment law.3 But it is also interesting as another
*
Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. I would like
to thank Bill Bratton, Steve Croley, Bill Novak and Richard Primus for their helpful
comments and Lauren Steinhaeuser and the staff of the Wisconsin Law Review for their
outstanding editorial work. This article is respectfully dedicated to my first mentors in
the law, Charlie Donahue and Morty Horwitz, without whose inspiration and guidance
it could never have been written.
1.
130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
2.
Id. at 917 (striking down 2 U.S.C § 441b (2006), which banned
corporate-funded independent expenditures).
3.
See, e.g., Matt Bodie, Two Small Thoughts on Citizens United,
PRAwFSBLAWG (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:13 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2010/01/two-small-thoughts-on-citizens-united.html; Ira Glasser, Understanding the
Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2010, 9:28 PM),
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step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation.' The thesis
of this Article is that by viewing Citizens United through the prism of
theories about the corporate form, it is possible to understand how both
the majority and the dissent departed from previous Supreme Court
cases on the First Amendment rights of corporations and to predict
what arguments can be expected next.
The corporation has evolved from its origins in Roman law
through a series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the
corporation as a separate legal person from its owners or members
developed with the work of the civil law Commentators in the
fourteenth century.' By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership
corporation-i.e., a corporation that had legal personality (the capacity
to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal
responsibility), unlimited life, and in which members chose their
successors-was well established' in both civil and common law
jurisdictions.' The next important step was the shift from non-profit
membership corporations to for-profit business corporations, which
took place in England and the U.S. at the end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth century.' The third transformation was the
shift from closely held corporations to corporations whose shares are
widely held and publicly traded. This also included the rise of limited
liability and freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.! Finally,
http://huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-the-emcitiz b_447342.html;
Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Integrity: Citizens United and the Path to a Better
PM),
http://
2010,
3:15
Democracy, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22,
www.huffmgtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/institutional-integrity-cb_433394.html?
view=screen; Lawrence Lessig, The Democrats' Response to Citizens United: Not
(Even Close to) Good Enough, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2010, 6:37 AM),
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/Lawrence-lessig/the-democrats-response-to-b
462412.html?view =screen; Eugene Volokh, Citizens United and the Mainstream
Media, THE
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Jan.
21,
2010,
6:01
PM),
Howard
http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/citizens-united-and-the-mainstream-media;
Wasserman, Further Thoughts on Citizens United, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:15
AM), http://prawfsblawg.bogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/further-thoughts-on-citizensunited.html.

4.
See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the
CorporateForm: A HistoricalPerspective on CorporateSocial Responsibility, 30 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 767 (2005) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations].
Id. at 780-82 (showing that by the time of Bartulos of Sassoferato (13145.
1357), the leading Commentator on the Corpus Juris Civilis in the fourteenth century,
the concept of the corporation as a separate legal person was fully developed).
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455-73 (describing
6.
the corporate form); Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4, at 783.
Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4, at 785-86; see, e.g.,
7.
JOSEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE, at v (1st ed., Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832).
Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations,supra note 4, at 793-94.
8.
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the last major transformation was from corporations doing business in
one country to multinational enterprises whose operations span the
globe, which began after World War II and is still ongoing.'
Each of these four transformations was accompanied by changes in
the legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however,
is that throughout all of these changes, spanning two millennia, the
same three theories of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories
are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate
of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views
the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory,
which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an
extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its
managers.o
In this Article, I will first discuss how the three theories of the
corporation are reflected in our historical jurisprudence, and then I will
show how Citizens United fits within this tradition. Part I discusses the
cyclical evolution of the three corporate theories from the eighteenth
century onward and shows that each transformation brought forth all
three theories, the real entity view always won and was the established
view during periods of stability. Part II applies this analysis to Citizens
United and its antecedents Bellotti and Austin, demonstrating that all
three theories arise in Bellotti and Austia, but that both the majority and
the dissent in Citizens United adopt the real entity view. Part IHI
concludes by predicting that the next confrontation will distinguish
between domestic and foreign corporations for First Amendment
purposes, that all three theories will be advanced, and that ultimately
the real entity view will prevail in this context as well.
I. THE CYCLICAL EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE THEORIES"

A. From Nonprofit to For-ProfitCorporations
By the time the American colonies declared themselves to be "free
and independent states," the corporation was well established in English
law as a membership corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of
members who selected their own successors, like the President and
Fellows of Harvard College still do today. As such, a corporation had
legal personality-the right to own property, sue and be sued, act under

Id. at 810-12.
9.
These three are standard theories found in literature. See, e.g., David
10.
Millon, Theoies of the Corporation,1990 DuKE L.J. 201.
11.
Part II is based on Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supranote 4.
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a common seal, and other such "chestnuts."" Private corporations were
used primarily for nonprofit purposes (e.g., hospitals and universities),
but by the eighteenth century there were also some commercial ones
(e.g., the East India Company)."
There were two important limitations on corporations in this
period. The first was royal control over corporations; in England and
other European countries corporations could only be established by
royal charter. Blackstone notes that although in Roman law
corporations could be established without "the prince's consent," "with
us in England, the king's consent is absolutely necessary."14 Second,
some degree of outside control over management was established
through the institution of the committee of visitors, which represented
the interests of the founder and of the wider community."
But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the
corporation prevailed throughout this period, and management (the
members) was firmly in control. "[A] corporation aggregate of many is
invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of
the law . . . .,

As such, it was a self-perpetuating body subject to

relatively little outside regulation. Corporations, Blackstone notes, are
"artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy
a kind of legal immortality."" When the members
are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their
successors are then considered as one person in law: as one
person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense
of the majority of the individuals . . . for all the individual

members that have existed from the foundation to the present
time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in
law, a person that never dies . . . . 1
This "one person" then acquires all the rights of corporations,
including perpetual succession.'" The King constituted corporations,

12.
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17 (1986). For a discussion of how
these basic features of corporate legal personality were established, see Avi-Yonah,

Cyclical Transformations, supra note 4.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at ch. XVIII (classifying and describing
13.
various corporations).
14.
Id. at 460; Tpling v. PexaiI,(1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1085 (K.B.) 1085 ("the
King creates them"); see also The Case of Sutton's Hospital(1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960
(K.B.) (providing an example of a charter enumerating corporate legal rights).
15.
BLAcKSTONE, supra note 6, at *467-69.
16.
The Case ofSutton's Hospital(1612)77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973.
17.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *455.
18.
Id. at *456.
19.
Id. at *463-64.
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and the King or other visitors exercised some degree of supervision
over them, but once established the corporation remained subject to
relatively little outside regulation.20
This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable,
especially since the members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate
debts." But the English kings were very cautious with granting
corporate charters, especially in the case of for-profit enterprises; only
corporations that were clearly vested with a public purpose and
benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay
Companies, received royal approval and accumulated vast power.22 As
more capital was required for commercial enterprises, promoters
organized corporations with transferable shares and claimed that under
the authority of a lost or obsolete charter the shareholders enjoyed
limited liability.23 Then, after the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, this
problem (and the desire of the East India Company to retain its
monopoly) led to the Bubble Act, under which it became a crime to
organize such corporations without explicit royal consent.24 Although
prosecutions under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire
Industrial Revolution in England (1760-1820) took place outside the
corporate form and without limited liability.25 The Bubble Act was
ultimately repealed in 1825, after the Industrial Revolution was over,
but the provision of unlimited liability for shareholders continued to be
the rule in England until 1855.26
This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state
control over corporations through restrictions on charters, meant that
the next great shift in the use of corporate form took place in the
fledgling United States. There, once the revolution was over, every
state could issue corporate charters. 27 The result was an explosion of
20.

See

generally Ron

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND

BUSINESS

INDUSTRIALIZING
HARRIS,
ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844

ENGLISH

LAW:

(2000) (discussing

historical development of corporations in England).
Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established
21.

by Blackstone's time for royally chartered corporations. "The debts of a corporation,
either to or from it, are totally extinguished by its dissolution; so that the members
thereof cannot recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities."
BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *472.
See Harris supra note 20, at 43-49 (discussing colonial corporations).
22.
Id. at 127-32.
23.
Bubble Act, 1719, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Gr. Brit.); see Harris, supranote 20.
24.
For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions, see The
25.
King v. Webb, (1811) 104 Eng. Rep. 658; The Kigg v. Dodd, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep.
670 (K.B.); see Harris, supra note 20, at 78-79.
26.
Bubble Act Repeal, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (UK); Limited Liability Act,
1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133 (U.K.).
See ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 35. For general discussions of state
27.
corporate charters, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 177-
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charters for commercial enterprises.28 Joseph Angell and Samuel
Ames's wrote one of the first treatises on corporate law, Treatise on the
Law of Private CorporationsAggregate, published in Boston in 1832.9
Angell and Ames begin their book by stating:
The reader does not require to be told, that we have in our
country an infinite number of corporations aggregate, which
have no concern whatever with affairs of a municipal nature.
These associations we not only find scattered throughout
every cultivated part of the United States, but so engaged are
they in all the varieties of useful pursuit, that we see them
directing the concentration of mind and capital to . . . the

encouragement and extension of the great interests of
commerce, agriculture, and manufactures. There is a great
difference in this respect between our own country, and the
country from which we have derived a great portion of our
laws. What is done in England by combination, unless it be
the management of municipal concerns, is most generally
done by a combination of individuals, established by mere
articles of agreement. On the other hand, what is done here
by the co-operation of several persons, is, in the greater
number of instances, the result of a consolidation effected by
an express act or charter of incorporation.o
The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United
States was the second great transformation in the role of the corporation
in society from primarily a nonprofit to primarily a for-profit
enterprise. As Judge Kent stated:
[Tihe multiplication of corporations in the United States, and
the avidity with which they are sought, have arisen in
consequence of the power which a large and consolidated
capital gives them over business of every kind; and the
202 (1985); KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 115-17 (1991); MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1780-1860, at 63-139 (1977).
28.
ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 35.
29.
Angell and Ames's work was preceded by the English work of Stewart
Kyd, published in London in 1793, but that treatise was devoted primarily to municipal
corporations. See id. at vi. The Angell and Ames treatise was very successful, with
eleven editions published through 1882.
30.
Id. at v; see also id. at 35 ("In no country have corporations been
multiplied to so great an extent, as in our own .... There is scarcely an individual of
respectable character in our community, who is not a member of, at least, one private
company or society which is incorporated. . . . . Acts of incorporation are moreover
continually solicited at every session of the legislature . . . .").
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facility which the incorporation gives to the management of
that capital, and the security which it affords to the persons of
its members, and to their property not vested in the corporate
stock."
This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival
of the centuries-old debate about the nature of the corporate form and
its relationship to the shareholders and the state. This debate can be
seen if we examine the opinions on the subject issued by the first great
American jurist, John Marshall. Three of Marshall's opinions, written
decades apart, are particularly relevant here: Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux,32 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,3 and Bank
4
These opinions represent the
of the United States v. Dandridge.1
evolution of his thinking on corporations, which moved from the
aggregate view, Deveaux, to the artificial entity view, Dartmouth
College, to the real entity view Dandridge.
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the
Savannah branch of the Bank of the United States, a corporation
established by Congress in 1791, as part of the early struggles around
federalism. 35 The Bank was a membership corporation ("The president,
directors and company of the bank of the United States") and all the
members were citizens of Pennsylvania.36 The Bank refused to pay the
tax, and the State sent its collectors to enforce payment, whereupon the
Bank sued the collectors in federal court, claiming diversity
jurisdiction." The issue facing the court was whether a corporation
made up of members from one state could sue citizens of another state
in federal court on diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding
between the view that "the individual character of the members is so
wholly lost in that of the corporation, that the court cannot take notice
of it," and the contrary view that "a corporation is composed of natural
persons," that is, between the entity (artificial or real) and aggregate
views. 38
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the
corporation itself, "that mere legal entity," cannot be a citizen or sue in

Id. at 36 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERiCAN LAW 219
31.
(New York City, 0. Halsted 1827)). The last sentence refers to limited liability, which
will be discussed below.
32.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).

33.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
Deveaux, 9. U.S. (5 Cranch) at 63, 73.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63-64.
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federal court unless it can be regarded as "a company of individuals." 9
However, since the reasons that led Congress to enact diversity
jurisdiction applied to corporations as well, Marshall was inclined to
see the controversy as being between the members "suing in their
corporate character" and their opponents.' "The controversy is
substantially between aliens, suing by a corporate name, and a citizen
. . . in this case the corporate name represents persons who are
members of the corporation." 4 1 The Court therefore held that federal
jurisdiction existed.
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue
involving corporations. In the famous Dartmouth College4 2 case, the
state of New Hampshire attempted to alter the charter of Dartmouth
College (incorporated as a membership corporation by George III in
1769, under the name of The Trustees of Dartmouth College),43 by
transferring the appointment of trustees to the state, thereby effectively
taking it over." The trustees objected, arguing that the charter
constituted a contract and that altering it violated the Contracts Clause
of the Constitution.45
Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its
charter was a contract and was protected by the Contracts Clause." He
began by noting that neither the funds for the College, which came
from private sources, or its educational character made it a public
corporation.47 He then got to the heart of the issue-whether the act of
incorporation by the state makes it possible for the state to take it over.
In frequently quoted language, Marshall held that "[a] corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.""
This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation.
Marshall then went on to note that, having created the corporation, the
state may not treat it as a mere extension of itself: "this being does not
share in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose
for which it was created."49 Even though its object is to promote
39.
40.

Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 87-88.

41.

Id. at 91.

42.
43.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.
Id. at 518-25.

44.

Id. at 626.

45.
46.

Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 650.

47.

Id. at 635.

48.

Id. at 636.

49.

Id.
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governmentally approved aims, this does not make corporations into
mere instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists to
represent the interest of the founder and his descendants in the aims for
which it was founded. In the United States, this interest is protected by
the contracts clause, although in England, Marshall recognized,
Parliament had the power to annul the charter.so In this country "the
body corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest,
and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of executing
the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.""
It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not
take over a private corporation, even one founded for public ends, the
emphasis on the artificial nature of the corporation left ample room for
state regulation via the original charter. Since states were busy granting
charters by the hundreds, the Dartmouth opinion thus enabled the states
to regulate corporations, should they wish to do so.
Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on
the nature of corporations in another case involving the Bank of the
United States.52 Dandridge involved a suit by the Bank, regarding a
bond executed by one of its cashiers, in which the defendant argued that
the bond had never been approved by the Board of Directors, as
required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue was whether the
level of evidence required of corporations was higher than that required
of individuals, since corporations are incapable of acting without
writing.53 Justice Story, writing for the Court, held that no distinction
should be made: "The same presumptions are . . . applicable to

corporations."

54

Marshall, however, dissented. He argued that

The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct
from the individuals who compose it, must be endowed with a
mode of action peculiar to itself, which will always
distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This
faculty must be exercised according to its own nature . . .
This can be done only by writing."
The Court's view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall's
view was more consistent with the real entity view of the corporation as
distinct from its members, individually or collectively. It certainly

Id. at 643.
50.
Id. at 654.
51.
52.
Bank of the US. v. Dandridge,25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1825) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 65-67.
53.
Id. at 70.
54.
Id. at 91-92 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
55.
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forms an interesting contrast with the views he expressed in the
Deveaux case sixteen years earlier.
How can one explain the shift in Marshall's view of the
corporation from aggregate (Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College)
to real (Dandridge)? In part, it stems from the circumstances of these
particular cases. In Deveaux, Marshall wanted to confer diversity
jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he was, after all, a
Federalist), and the only way to do so was to look through the
corporation to its members. In Dartmouth College, the issue involved
the relationship of private corporations (albeit "imbued with a public
purpose," the full-fledged private/public distinction had not yet
evolved) to the state, and thus Marshall emphasized the role of the state
in creating the corporation, while placing clear limits on its ability to
regulate corporations thereafter. These limits were required as the
result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for-profit business
corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over
purely private businesses. In practice, the result in Dartmouth College
favored the real entity view: once a private corporation was created, it
could no longer be taken over-or perhaps even overly regulated-by
the state. Thus, it may not be surprising that by the time he came to
write his Dandridge dissent Marshall took the real entity view, even
though it contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which was not
mentioned).
Two important legal developments during the same period
strengthened the real entity view and weakened the aggregate and
artificial entity views of the corporation: the rise of limited liability and
the spread of general incorporation laws. Limited liability weakened the
aggregate view, and general incorporation weakened the artificial entity
view. First, limited liability: As we have seen in England, limited
liability did not exist for corporations until 1855. In the United States,
however, most states adopted limited liability in the 1830s. In their
first edition, Angell and Ames explain the primary distinction between
a partnership and a corporation:
In every private unincorporated company, the members are
liable for the debts without limitation; whereas in incorporated
societies, they are only liable to the extent of their shares
. . . . It is frequently the principal object, in this and in other
countries, in procuring an act of incorporation, to limit the
risk of the partners to their shares in the stock of the
association; and prudent men are always backward in taking

LAW

56.
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG,
17 (1993).
57.
Id. at 10-12.

THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE To CORPORATION
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stock, when they become mere copartners as regards their
personal liability for the company debts.8
When Angell and Ames wrote this, limited liability was by no
means a universally established rule for corporations; 9 the authors were
thus trying to establish the law as much as describe the law that existed.
Their main argument, familiar from current debates on limited
liability,' was that "[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts incorporating
trading associations, as by such means persons are induced to hazard a
certain amount of property for the purposes of trade and public
improvement, who would abstain from so doing, were not their liability
thus limited. "61
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the
states had established limited liability. 62 Limited liability, in turn, led to
a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory because the aggregate
view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction between the
corporation and its members or shareholders, which is at the heart of
limited liability.

The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases
from the period of 1839 to 1844, in which the Supreme Court

58.
ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 23; see also id., at 349 ("No rule of
law, we believe, is better settled, than that, in general, the individual members of a
private corporate body are not liable for the debts."); id. at 36 (citing a quote from
Judge Kent emphasizing limited liability as a reason to incorporate).
59.
BLUMBERG, supra note 56, at 10.
60.
See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unimited
Liability: A CapitalMarkets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, Do the CapitalMarkets Compel Limited Liability?: A Response
to Professor Gundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE
L.J. 1879 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (2002).
61.
ANGELL & AMEs, supra note 7, at 24; see also id. at 362 (arguing that
states who pursue the contrary policy, like Massachusetts, "drive millions of capital
into the neighboring states for investment"-an early instance of a "race" (to the top or
bottom)).
62.
This was subject to one limitation, the "trust fund" doctrine, which said
that the capital stock of a corporation was to be held in trust to pay corporate debts and
thus could not be distributed to shareholders while debts were outstanding. See Wood
v. Duinmer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (D. Me. 1824).
63.
See generally Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate
Law Achieved for Business Organizersin the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv.
387 (2003) (arguing that the main purpose of incorporation in the nineteenth century
was to "lock in" capital in the firm because shareholders could not force distributions in
exchange for limited liability); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential
Role of OrganizationalLaw, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (describing the "core
defining characteristic of a legal entity" as the "partitioning off of a separate set of
assets in which the creditors of the firm have a prior security interest").
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repudiated Marshall's opinion in Deveaux. In Bank of Augusta v.
Earle' the Court held that a corporation incorporated by Georgia could
execute a valid contract in Alabama on comity grounds.' However, the
Court rejected the argument that Alabama was required to accept the
contract on the basis that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applied
directly to the corporation's members (as required by the aggregate
view), stating that Deveaux had never been extended that far.' Chief
Justice Taney emphasized that he rejected the aggregate view because
of its implications for limited liability, as well as the implications for
state regulation of the corporations:
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the
corporation a mere partnership in business, in which each
stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his
property for the debts of the corporation . . . . Besides, it

would deprive every state of all control over the extent of
corporate franchises proper to be granted in the State ....
In Louisville, Cincinnati, and CharlestonRailroadCo. v. Letson,"
decided in 1844, the Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts,
holding that diversity jurisdiction may arise even when some of the
members of a defendant corporation are citizens of the same state as the
plaintiff.6 9 The Court stated that the Deveaux results "have never been
satisfactory to the bar" and that a corporation "seems to us to be a
person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that State
[of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and
being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that State." 70
This result was required by the proliferation of business
corporations having many shareholders in many states, as opposed to
the membership corporations of Marshall's early days. As Angell and
Ames state, by 1832 "[j]oint stock companies are composed of persons
who seldom know any thing of the business of the company, but who
leave the management of it entirely to the board of directors, and are

64.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
65.
Id. at 585, 596.
66.
Id. at 586-87.
67.
Id.
68.
43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
69.
Id at 554-55.
70.
Id. at 555. See also Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16
How.) 314, 328 (1853) (holding that for diversity purposes a corporation should be
deemed a resident of its place of incorporation). This led to the current rule, adopted in
1958, under which a corporation is for diversity purposes a citizen of both the state in
which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
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contented with receiving such periodical dividends as the directors think
proper to make."" The separation of management from ownership, and
the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate view implausible.72
Second, general incorporation: in the 1820s and 1830s the granting
of corporate charters by state legislatures became a process fraught with
corruption." Some Jacksonians reacted by advocating elimination of the
rights of states to grant corporate charters.7 But the corporate form was
so widely used that this was impracticable; instead, laws were passed in
all the states permitting anyone to form a corporation on payment of a
fee without permission by the state legislature." This democratizing
move meant that the artificial entity theory, under which the
71.
72.

& AMES, supra note 7, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
See Chief Justice Shaw's statement:
ANGELL

A board of directors of the banks of Massachusetts is a body recognized by
law. By the by-laws of these corporations, and by a usage, so general and
uniform as to be regarded as part of the law of the land, they have the
general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of the
bank, and constitute, to all purposes of dealing with others, the
corporation."
Burrill v. NahantBank, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 163, 166-67 (1840) (emphasis added).
It is hard to imagine a clearer rejection of the aggregate view. See also Hoyt v.
Thompson's Executor, in which the New York Court of Appeals held
[I]n corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a very
important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer,
nor can they revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of
being received from the State in the act of incorporation. The directors
convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which the
charter confers, and like private principals they may delegate to agents of
their own appointment the performance of any acts which they themselves
can perform. The recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the
affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a board of
directors. Without it the most ordinary business could not be carried on,
and the corporate powers could not be executed.
19 N.Y. (5 Smith) 207, 216 (1859). This constitutes a recognition that the
aggregate view derived from the membership corporation could not be maintained
as a practical matter in corporations with hundreds or thousands of shareholders,
as already existed in the 1850s.
73.
See ANGELL & AMES, supra note 7, at 35-36; JAMES W. HURST, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 17801970, at 33-36 (1970); MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND
199-201 (1957).
74.
HURST, supranote 73, at 33-36; MEYERS, supranote 73, at 5, 201.
75.
See, e.g., Act Relating to Joint Stock Corporations, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts
49, 49 (permitting incorporation of any "lawful" business); Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 812, 817-18 (1849); see also President Jackson's veto of the second
bank of the United States: "[i]f [the government] would confine itself to equal
protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the
low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing," Andrew Jackson, Veto
Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 590 (1896).
BELIEF
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corporation derives its powers from the state, lost most of its appeal,
since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations.
Instead, corporations were viewed as separate from both their
shareholders and the state, and the real entity view reigned supreme."
B. From Closely Held to Widely Held Corporations
The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was
thus the proliferation of for-profit corporations, incorporated under
general incorporation laws with minimal interference by the state and
with shareholders who enjoyed limited liability. Those shareholders
were, however, relatively few in number; despite the Angell and Ames
quotation above,n few corporations before 1865 required massive
amounts of capital, and most were small, closely held enterprises."
This enabled the Civil War income tax on corporate income to be
imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations."
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the
railroads, followed by the steel and oil companies. With the rise of
large corporate enterprises, massive amounts of capital were required,
and between 1865 and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded, nonowner managed enterprise gradually became the norm for U.S.
business activities.so This was followed from 1890 to 1906 by a wave of
consolidation that left several important business areas dominated by
monopolies run by the Robber Barons."
The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly
held ones once again necessitated a re-examination of the corporate
form, and again all three theories of the corporation appear. A classic
example of the aggregate view is Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co.,82 ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in
1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice Waite's statement that
"[t]he court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
[Equal Protection Clause] .

.

. applies to these corporations. We are all

of the opinion that it does.""" Some scholars identified this as an
76.
The same result was obtained in England by the adoption of the Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (U.K.).
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,Society, and the State: A Defense of
78.
the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REv. 1193, 1213 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah,
Corporations].
79.
Id.
Id. at 1227, 1232.
80.
81.
Id. at 1227.

82.

118 U.S. 394 (1886).

Id. at 396. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited:
83.
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173, 173-74 (1985).
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application of the real entity view to corporations," but Professor
Horwitz has shown, by examining Justice Field's opinion in the court
below, that it actually represented an application of the aggregate
view. Specifically, Field held that the Equal Protection Clause must
apply to corporations for the following reasons:
[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals
united for some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a
common name in their business and have succession of
membership without dissolution . . . . But the members do

not, because of such association, lose their right to protection,
and equality of protection....
Whatever affects the property of the corporation-that is,
of all the members united by the common name-necessarily
affects their interests.

. . . So, therefore, whenever a

provision of the constitution or of a law guaranties to persons
protection in their property . . . the benefits of the provision
... are extended to corporations; not to the name under

which different persons are united, but to the individuals
composing the union. The courts will always look through the
name to see and protect those whom the name represents."
A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined;
most remarkable is Field's reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the
Supreme Court overturned its results forty years earlier." Similarly, in
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania,88 decided two years later, Justice
Field stated that, "[u]nder the designation of person there is no doubt
that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely
associations of individuals united for a special purpose.""
However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases.
In Santa Clara, the railroad corporations made the argument that
because they were operating under special congressional legislation,
they should be regarded as an extension of the federal government and
therefore California could not tax them.' Field rejected this view
84.
85.
86.

Horwitz, supra note 82, at 178.
Id. at 174, 177-78, 223.
Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402-03 (D. Cal.

1883).
87.
Id. at 403.
88.
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181 (1888).
89.
Id. at 189. See also Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59
(1890) ("We do not see that the rights of the parties in regard to the assets of this
corporation differ from those of a partnership on its dissolution.").
90.
Santa Clara, 18 F. at 387.
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(citing Dartmouth College), but noted that "when the instrumentality is
the creation of the state,-a corporation formed under its laws,-and is
employed or adopted by the general government for its convenience
...

it remains subject to the taxing power of the state."" And notably,

in Pembina, Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause applied to corporations because they
were not "citizens," even though the aggregate view he adopted in
Santa Clara might have led to the contrary position.' Instead, Field
emphasized the relationship between the corporation and the
incorporating state under the artificial entity view:
[T]he term citizens, as used in the clause, applies only to
natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance
to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature,
and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has
prescribed . . . a grant of corporate existence was a grant of

special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for
certain specified purposes as a single individual, and
exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual
liability.93
Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v.
Henkel,' decided by the Supreme Court in 1906. The issue was
whether an agent of a corporation could invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure in the name of the
corporation.95 On the Fifth Amendment issue, the Court held that the
right against self-incrimination did not apply to corporations:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to
incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the
witness . . . . The question whether a corporation is a

"person" within the meaning of this Amendment really does
not arise . . . since it can only be heard by oral evidence in

the person of some one of its agents or employ6s.96
This is closest to the real entity view since it rejects (like Marshall
in Dandridge) the aggregate position of looking through a corporation

91.
92.

Id. at 389.
Pembina, 125 U.S. at 187.

93.
94.

Id. at 187-88.
201 U.S. 43 (1906).

95.
96.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 69-70.
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to its shareholders and takes into account the special characteristics of
the corporation itself.
On the other hand, regarding the Fourth Amendment question, the
Court at first emphasized the artificial entity view, using it to justify
regulation by the state:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation
under investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the
rights of the corporation with respect to the production of its
books and papers, we are of the opinion that there is a clear
distinction in this particular between an individual and a
corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit
its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the
State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights
as a citizen. . . .
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the
State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the
public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises,
and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the
limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can
make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act
as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys
the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it
has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to
hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to make use
of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its
sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed,
and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose
. . . . While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity
statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with
special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand
when charged with an abuse of such privileges."

97.
Id. at 74-75. Remarkably, the court applied this analysis to give powers to
the federal government over state corporations:
It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the
laws of New Jersey, and that it receives its franchise from the legislature of
that State; but such franchises, so far as they involve questions of interstate
commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of
Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General
Government may also assert a sovereign authority to ascertain whether such
franchises have been exercised in a lawful manner, with a due regard to its
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However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the
application of the constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverted back
to the aggregate view when faced with the question of whether
corporations have any Fourth Amendment rights at all:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth

Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals
under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be
proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, against unlawful
discrimination. Corporations are a necessary feature of
modem business activity, and their aggregated capital has
become the source of nearly all great enterprises."
What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three
views? The key is the last sentence quoted. As noted above, the period
between 1890 and 1906 marked the height of the debate on the rise of
the great corporations. The Court is trying to strike a balance between
the rights of the corporations, which can best be protected under either
the aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the
state, which is best reflected in the artificial entity view. On the one
hand, as the Court states, "[clorporations are a necessary feature of
modem business activity" and must be protected." On the other hand,
the right of the state to regulate must also be preserved, especially since
the context of Hale was an antitrust investigation into two major
corporations, the American Tobacco Company and McAndrews &
Forbes Inc.

own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General Government
possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected as the State
would have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of
the State. The powers of the General Government in this particular in the
vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the corporation had been
created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to intimate, however, that
it has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.
Id. at 75. This issue came up in the corporate tax debate as well. Avi-Yonah,
Corporations,supra note 78, at 1214-19.
Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).
98.
99.
Id.
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Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.'" This first
involved the rejection of the aggregate view. For example, in Western
Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg,0' decided just one year after Hale, Justice
Harlan emphasized that a corporation is a separate entity from its
shareholders, and therefore it is not a "citizen" for purposes of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause or entitled to the protection of the due
process clause: "the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural,
not artificial, persons."" But by itself this position would have led to
too much state regulation for the Lochner Court. Thus, in Southern
Railway Co. v. Greene,"os decided in 1909, the Court came out clearly
for the position that the corporation as such was entitled to
constitutional protection under the Equal Protection Clause, without any
reference to its shareholders: "the corporation . . . is within the

meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the jurisdiction
of the State of Alabama, and entitled to be protected against any statute
of the State which deprives it of the equal protection of the laws.""
Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained
by several factors. The aggregate view was raised by Field and others
to protect the rights of corporations, but it was even more incongruous
in the context of the mega-corporations of the 1890s, with thousands of
shareholders, than in the pre-Civil War days. It also gave the
corporation too many rights vis-A-vis the state, as seen in Hale and in
Greenberg. The artificial entity view gave the state too much power to
regulate corporations, as the Hale court came to realize when it laid out
its implications. The real entity view was most congruent with business
realities as well as the one most suited to a corporation-state balance.
By 1909, it was well established as the dominant view of the
100. This view was also reflected in contemporary books and law review
articles. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 81-83
(1897); George F. Deiser, The JuristicPerson, 57 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 131,
131-133 (1908); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV.
404, 413 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., CorporatePersonality, 24 HARV. L. REV.
253, 261-62 (1911); I.Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 516 (1912) (all rejecting the aggregate view). But see VICTOR
MORAWETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN
CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (supporting the aggregate view, stating that "the existence of a
corporation independently of its shareholders is a fiction").
204 U.S. 359 (1907).
101.
102. Id. at 363.
103. 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
104. Id. at 417. Remarkably this case involves a discriminatory state tax similar
to the one struck down by Field on aggregate grounds in Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 36 (1910). See Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 64 (1910)
(White, J., concurring); see also Ludwig v. W. Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 157
(1910) (eliminating the restrictions imposed by Bank ofAugusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519
(1839)); Horwitz, supranote 83.
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corporation, as reflected in contemporary debates surrounding the
enactment of the corporate tax. "
The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other
contemporary developments: the rise of the business judgment rule and
the decline of the ultra vires doctrine. " The business judgment rule
rejected the aggregate view in holding that the board of directors
possessed powers that were not delegated from the shareholders and
that shareholders could not normally call into question the exercise of
those powers. The ultra vires doctrine represented the ability of the
state to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and was thus
based on the artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the
rejection of that view.
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in
Leslie v. Lorillard,o' decided by the New York Court of Appeals in
1888. The court held
[i]n actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their
directors or trustees, courts will not interfere unless the
powers
have been illegally
or unconscientiously
executed . . . . Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as

105. See Avi-Yonah, Corporations,supranote 78.
106. Another related development was the strengthening of limited liability
resulting from the demise of the "trust fund" doctrine, which held that the capital stock
of a corporation must be held in trust for the benefit of its creditors. This doctrine,
which originated from Justice Story's opinion in Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435,
436-37 (D. Me. 1824), was upheld by the Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S.
610, 623 (1873), on the basis of the aggregate view ("after all, this artificial body is but
the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for their benefit, and is
governed and controlled by them through the officers whom they elect"). See also
WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 322 (New
York City, Baker, Voorhis & Co., Law Publishers 1887) [hereinafter COOK, LAW OF
STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS]. However, in 1892 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held
in Hospes v. Northwestern Manufacturmg& Car Co.
This trust-fund doctrine . . . . is not sufficiently precise or accurate
to constitute a safe foundation upon which to build a system of legal rules
.... Corporate property is not held in trust . . . . Absolute control and

power of disposition are inconsistent with the idea of a trust. The capital of
a corporation is its property . . . . [A] corporation is in law as distinct a

being as an individual is, and is entitled to hold property (if not contrary to
its charter) as absolutely as an individual can hold it.
48 Minn. 174, 192-193 (1892). The doctrine then fell into desuetude, reinforced
by the invention of no par stock in the early twentieth century. See Horwitz,
supra note 82, at 207-14.
107. 110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888).
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grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted with
corporate management are largely discretionary."o'
A year later the same court expanded this statement:
All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly
granted, of necessity, must be exercised by the directors who
are constituted by the law as the agency for the doing of
corporate acts. The expression of the corporate will and the
performance of corporate functions, in the management of a
corporation, may originate with its directors . . . . Within the

chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate the
concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment
. . . . In the management of the affairs of the corporation,
they are dependent solely upon their own knowledge of its
business and their own judgment as to what its interests
require. "9
This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could
write that "it is [the board's] judgment, and not that of its stockholders
outside of the board of directors . . . that is to shape [a corporation's]

policies or decide upon its corporate acts. This principle is not
disputed, and the citation of authorities in its support is unnecessary."no
The rule reflected the real entity view, which equates the corporation
with its management, and rejected the view of the corporation as an
aggregate of its shareholders."'
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the
ultra vires doctrine, which held that a board could not act contrary to
the powers conferred on it by the state. The ultra vires doctrine thus
represented the artificial entity view. The doctrine originated in the preCivil War Era," 2 but became prominent in the arguments on the
relationship of the state and the corporation in the 1880s and 1890s."'

108.
109.

Id.
Beveridge v. N. Y ElevatedR.R. Co., 112 N.Y. 1, 22 (1889).

110. Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 140 F. 117, 118 (D.N.J. 1905); see also
Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323 (1918) ("Directors are the exclusive, executive
representatives of the corporation and are charged with the administration of its internal
affairs and the management and use of its assets. Clearly the law does not permit the
stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors." (citation omitted)).
111. It also represented a transition from an agency to a trustee model of the
relationship between shareholders and management. See Millon, supranote 10.
112. See, e.g., Abbott v. Am. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1861).
113.
See generally COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, supra note 106,
at chs. 19, 38.
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The artificial entity argument for upholding the limitation was stated
clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888:
In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have
had in view the public interest; and public policy is (as the
interests of stockholders ought to be) concerned in the
restriction of corporations within chartered limits, and a
departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot
result in prejudice to the public or to the stockholders. As
artificial creations, they have no powers or faculties, except
those with which they were endowed when created . . .. 114
.

. .

Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the

public convenience, and for the development of public wealth,
and, so long as they are conducted for the purposes for which
organized, they are a public benefit; but if allowed to engage,
without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their
charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control and
monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are
engaged, they become a public menace; against which public
policy and statutes design protection."

The artificial entity doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court the
following year:
It may be considered as the established doctrine of this
court in regard to the powers of corporations, that they are
such and such only as are conferred upon them by the acts of
the legislatures of the several States under which they are
organized. A corporation in this country, whatever it may
have been in England at a time when the crown exercised the
right of creating such bodies, can only have an existence
under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it
is created. And these powers, where they do not relate to
municipal corporations exercising authority conferred solely
for the benefit of the public, and in some sense parts of the
body politic of the State, have in this country until within
recent years always been conferred by special acts of the
legislative body under which they claim to exist. But the rapid
growth of corporations, which have come to take a part in all
or nearly all of the business operations of the country, and
especially in enterprises requiring large aggregations of
114.
115.

Leslie v. Loillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 531.
Id. at 533.

HeinOnline -- 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 1020 2010

2010:999

Citizens United and the CorporateForm

1021

capital and individual energy, as well as their success in
meeting the needs of a vast number of most important
commercial relations, have demanded the serious attention
and consideration of law makers. And while valuable services
have been rendered to the public by this class of
organizations, which have stimulated their formation by
numerous special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they
were attended by many evils in their operation as well as
much good, and that the hasty manner in which they were
created by the legislatures, sometimes with exclusive
privileges, often without due consideration and under the
influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results."'
The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and
indeed the ultra vires doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts
under New York and Ohio law. 117 However, in 1895 the Supreme
Court rejected an antitrust challenge to the sugar trust on the grounds
that the Sherman Act applied only to corporations engaged directly in
interstate commerce."' And in 1896 the Court rejected an ultra vires
challenge on the ability of the Union Pacific Railway to lease its tracks
for 999 years to another railroad, when the charter would not permit an
outright sale." 9 This literal decision significantly reduced the power of
the ultra vires doctrine. 120
The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court
decision but from the competition among states to attract corporate
charters, which was begun by New Jersey in 1890 and continued by
Delaware in the 1900s.121 This competition meant that New Jersey and
116.
Or. R.R & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian R.R. Co., 130 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1889).
117. See People v. N. River Sugar Ref Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890); State, ex
rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 184-85 (1892); see also WILLIAM COOK, THE
CORPORATION PROBLEM 225 (1891); Theodore Dwight, The Legality of Trusts, 3 POLL
Sci. Q. 592 (1888).
United States v. E.C Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895).
118.
119.
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 163 U.S.
564, 585 (1896).
120. See 2 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS,
BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 971, 971-72 (3d ed. 1894)
[hereinafter 2 COOK, STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS] ("The courts are becoming more
liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago would have been held to be ultra vires
would now be held to be intra vires."). By 1898 Cook wrote that "the doctrine of ultra
1 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
vires is disappearing."
CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK, at vii (4th ed. 1898) [hereinafter I COOK,
CORPORATIONS]. See also Horwitz, supra note 82, at 186-88 (discussing this

development).
121.
See RUSSEL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 1-26
(1937); Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L.
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Delaware had every incentive to relax any limiting elements in their
charters that restricted the power of corporate management.122 Thus, for
example, the long-lasting prohibition against corporations owning stock
in other corporations, which led to the necessity of "trusts," was
eliminated by New Jersey in its 1896 law.123 As a result, although the
Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra
vires under New York law, this holding became rather meaningless
since most large, publicly traded corporations were incorporated in
New Jersey. 124 As the New Jersey statute explains, "[i]t was formerly
the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in excess of its express
powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and contracts which
were ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or
ratification.... This rule no longer obtains." 12 5
The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of
corporate laws permitting incorporation for "any lawful activity."l 26
With the doctrine gone, the artificial entity view of the corporation
became less plausible, and the real entity view reigned supreme

again.127
C. The Hostile Takeover Crisis
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal
in which he dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate,
REV. 198, 201 (1899); Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 25 McLuRE's
MAGAZINE 41 (1905). On the "race to the bottom/race to the top" debate, see generally

Lucian Arye Benchuk, Federalismand the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1444-46 (1992); William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
664 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN.
ECON. 525, 526-28 (2001); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection,
and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977).
122. See New Jersey Legislating for the United States, INDIANAPOLIS J., Nov.
11, 1901; James B. Dill, Address Before the Merchants' Club of Chicago, Illinois:
Trusts: Their Uses and Abuses (Nov. 9, 1901).
123. General Corporation Act of New Jersey, N.J. Comp. Stat. § 51 (1896);
see also id. § 104 (authorizing mergers); 1 COOK, CORPORATIONS, supra note 120,
at vi.

124.

De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Say. lnst., 175 U.S.

40, 52 (1899).
125. JAMEs B. DILL, THE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT OF NEW JERSEY 11
(1903).

126. Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires-Ultra Useless: The Myth of State
Interestin Ultra Vires Acts ofBusiness Corporations,9 J. CORP. L. 81, 89 (1983).
127. See Machen, supra note 100, at 260-61. Another significant development
in this period was states passing statutes that allowed a majority of shareholders to sell
corporate assets (before the 1890s, shareholder unanimity was required). This greatly
facilitated mergers and also represented the decline of the aggregate view. See Horwitz,
supra note 82, at 200-02.
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artificial entity, and real entity views of the corporation. 12 These
views, he explains, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he uses
examples relying on the cyclical nature of these theories.129 His
conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of
reality.13 0
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate
personality largely disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter,
however, the real entity view predominated for large, publicly traded
corporations. The board ran the corporation as it saw fit, protected
from the shareholders by the separation of ownership from management
noted by Berle and Means in the 1930s' and by the business judgment
rule. The board was also protected from the state by the relaxation of
corporate law limits begun by New Jersey and continued by

Delaware.13 2
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only
arose in the 1980s. As a result of the invention of the junk bond
market, it suddenly became possible for hostile raiders to threaten
takeovers of even the largest corporations. After RJR Nabisco was
taken private for $25 billion in 1988,133 it was clear that no board was
safe. As a result, debates on the nature of the corporation and its
relationship to the shareholders and the state, which began in the
academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of
practical concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation
reappeared, as can be seen if one examines three seminal cases decided
between 1982 and 1989 by the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Delaware.

128.

35

John Dewey, The HistoricalBackground of CorporateLegal Personality,

YALE L.J. 655,

129.
130.

673 (1926).

Id. at 669.
Id. at 673.

131.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4-5 (1932).

C.

MEANS,

THE

MODERN

132. This state of affairs prompted Adolph Berle, the prime intellect behind the
shareholder primacy doctrine in the 1930s, to concede defeat in 1956:
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late
Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that
corporate powers were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor
Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the entire community.
The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor
of Professor Dodd's contention.
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
133. See generally Bryan BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990) (describing the $25 billion leveraged buyout
of RJR Nabisco).
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Edgar v. MITE Corp.,13 4 decided by the Supreme Court in 1982,
involved the constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state
of Illinois.'" Under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile
tender offer for the shares of a company covered by the act had to be
registered by the Secretary of State, and the offeror had to give both the
target and the state a twenty-day notice during which only the target
could communicate with its shareholders regarding the offer.136 The act
applied both to corporations in which 10 percent of the shareholders
were residents of Illinois and to corporations that were either
incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it.137 The MITE
corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused
to comply with the act, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause. "
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4
majority, Justice White held that the Illinois act was unconstitutional
because it could apply to tender offers that did not affect a single
Illinois shareholder, specifically, that "the State has no legitimate
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders."' 39 Moreover, the fact
that the target corporation was an Illinois corporation was irrelevant
since state regulation only applied to the corporation's internal affairs:
"[tiender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a
third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the
target company."'" Instead, the focus should be entirely on the impact
of blocking the tender offer on the company's shareholders and their
relationship with management:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders
are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their
highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer
mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well
so that stock prices remain high is reduced.14 1
This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view. The
focus is entirely on the impact on the corporation's shareholders, and
the corporation itself (including its management) barely exists-as
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

457 U.S. 624 (1982).
Id. at 626.
Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 643-44 (citations omitted).
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indicated by the statement that a change in corporate control has no
relevance to the internal affairs of the corporation. The market for
corporate control is praised because of its ability to overcome the
agency cost problem and the incentive it provides for management to
maximize stock prices. Moreover, White quotes the work of
Easterbrook and Fischel, who are among the principal proponents of
the "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation, according to which
the corporation is merely a convenient legal term for a series of
contracts, the most important of which is the contract between
shareholders and management.142
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and
the real entity theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice
Powell, even though he joined to provide the crucial fifth vote.143
Powell noted that in some cases the state may have a legitimate interest
because the corporation has a real presence that goes beyond a contract
between management and the shareholders, reflecting both the artificial
and real entity views:
I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning
leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers. This
period in our history is marked by conglomerate corporate
formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws. Often
the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional
personnel experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that
vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This disparity in
resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or
regional target corporation. Inevitably there are certain
adverse consequences in terms of general public interest when
corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and
State. *

* The corporate headquarters of the great national and
multinational corporations tend to be located in the large
cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters are
transferred out of a city and State into one of these

142. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 117374 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1273 (1982) ("A corporation .

.

. is nothing more than a legal fiction that

serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily
entered into for their mutual benefit."). The point that the nexus of contracts theory is a
reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly. See, e.g., William W.
Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1478-79 (1989); Millon, supra note 10, at 229.
143. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
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metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which
the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.
Management personnel-many of whom have provided
community leadership-may move to the new corporate
headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and
educational life-both in terms of leadership and financial
support-also tend to diminish when there is a move of
corporate headquarters.'4
Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these
misgivings into an opinion for the Court that emphasized instead the
artificial entity view of the corporation. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America'45 involved a so-called "second generation" anti-takeover
statute, i.e., one that was drafted to get around the problems with the
Illinois statute struck down in MITE.'" The Indiana statute applied only
to corporations incorporated in Indiana, which have specified levels of
shareholders within the state and which opt for its protection. 147 Under
the statute, an acquirer who acquired "control shares" in such an
Indiana target could vote them only with the approval of a majority of
the pre-existing disinterested shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting
within fifty days of the acquisition."
The Court of Appeals followed MITE and declared the statute
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, because it interfered with
the market for corporate control:
Even if a corporation's tangible assets are immovable,
the efficiency with which they are employed and the
proportions in which the earnings they generate are divided
between management and shareholders depends on the market
for corporate control-an interstate, indeed international,
market that the State of Indiana is not authorized to opt out of
149

The Supreme Court reversed.'
majority, stated

144.

Id.

145.
146.

481 U.S. 69 (1987).
Id.

Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4

147.
Id. at 72-73.
148.
Id. at 73-75.
149. Id. at 77 (quoting Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)).
150.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica, 481 U.S. at 89.
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[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State's authority to regulate domestic
corporations, including the authority to define the voting
rights of shareholders ....
. . . We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the
significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that
state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of
entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of
state law. As Chief Justice Marshall explained:
"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.
These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect
the object for which it was created."'

Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to
regulate transactions affecting shareholders, including shareholders in
other states. He argued that the "free market system depends at its core
upon the fact that a corporation . . . is organized under, and governed
by, the law of a single jurisdiction. . . . A State has an interest in

promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the
corporations it charters."152 And he explicitly rejected the market for
corporate control, and its underlying aggregate theory:
The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to
any particular economic theory. . . .

15

. . . [T]here is no reason to assume that the type of
conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive
takeovers will result in more effective management or
otherwise be beneficial to shareholders. . . . 154
. . . [T]he very commodity that is traded in the "market for
corporate control"-the corporation-is one that owes its
existence and attributes to state law. 55

151.
Id. (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 636 (1819)).
152. Id. at 90-91.
153. Id. at 92.
154. Id. at 92 n.13.
155. Id. at 94.
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This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is
clearly based on the artificial entity view that the corporation owes its
existence to the incorporating state and that the state may therefore
regulate it, including in ways that affect shareholders' ability to sell
their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White dissented, arguing that
while the statute may help Indiana corporations, "particularly in helping
those corporations maintain the status quo,""' it is inimical to the
"economic
interests of the shareholders and constitutes
protectionism."'
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and
the most important state in this regard was Delaware-the state in
which most major U.S. corporations are incorporated. Delaware law
was favorable to hostile takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court
of Delaware issued an opinion in Paramount v. Time, Inc. ' that, in
practice, ended the hostile takeover boom. 59 Paramount had made $175
(later raised to $200) per share offer (for Time) when Time was about
to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner." Paramount argued
that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.'6 1 and Revelon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,1 62 Time was "up for sale," and
therefore, the business judgment rule was suspended and Time's board
was required to maximize shareholder value by accepting the much
higher Paramount bid.163
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated
Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware
law imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation. This broad mandate
includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate
profitability. Thus, the question of "long-term" versus "shortterm" values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally,
are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in
its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon.
Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under
Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 98.
Id. at 100.
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
See id. at 1155.
Id. at 1147-49.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Paramount,571 A.2d at 1142.
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an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover.'"
The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term
shareholder value was always required. Instead, the board was
permitted to pursue its view of the best long-term corporate strategy:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate
enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board
representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate
enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for
achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be
delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to
abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a shortterm shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy.165
Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the "Time
culture"-its stated goal over maximizing the cash return to
shareholders. This effectively killed the takeover threat, because any
board could find good long-term share-value maximization reasons to
reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware court, thus enhancing
managerial power, in effect endorsed the real entity view: a corporation
was an entity with its own corporate culture, which should not be
subordinated to the shareholders or to the state. This view was ratified
when the ALI corporate governance project adopted a rule that
corporate boards may take into account the interests of other
"stakeholders," not just the shareholders."
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that
corporate management determines the state of incorporation, and
therefore the Delaware Supreme Court felt that it had to side with
management once the U.S. Supreme Court had approved the antitakeover laws of other states, lest corporations choose to relocate there.
However, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason; Delaware is
very well established as the preferred state of incorporation," and
stock values would likely decrease if shareholders perceive that
management was leaving Delaware just to protect itself. Instead, it
seems likely that the Delaware Supreme Court genuinely believed that a
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1150 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1154 (citations omitted).
1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(3) cmt. i. (1994).
167. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts,81 VA. L. REv. 757, 842-45 (1995).
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corporation like Time had a corporate existence and culture with
implications for other stakeholders, and therefore rejected the aggregate
view equating the corporation with its shareholders. In that way, its
concerns were similar to those raised by Justice Powell in his
concurrence in MITE: a corporation is more than a "nexus of
contracts," and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the interests
of other stakeholders into account. 168
D. From NationalCorporationsto MultinationalEnterprises
The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in
the 1950s and is still on-going, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to
judge. This is the transformation from corporations based mostly in one
country to multinational enterprises based in many countries.
Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets
overseas, have existed since the seventeenth century. 6 9 However, as
recently as the 1950s, the shareholders (and other sources of capital),
the management, most of the production facilities, and most of the
markets of even large multinationals tended to be in one country, so
that, essentially, what was good for G.M. was good for America.170
Since the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly.'"' As
more countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications
improved, and many products became lighter and easier to ship, more
and more corporations became "globalized." In a globalized
multinational, the sources of capital are in many countries. The shares
of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty exchanges, and
borrowing facilities are similarly diversified. Research and development
and production facilities are likewise spread around the globe, as are
markets. The only thing that usually ties a modem multinational to its
home country is the location of management.' 72
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has
re-opened. There is abundant academic writing on the relationship
between multinationals and the state, and most writers from both left
and right concede that this relationship has changed profoundly so that
the home state-the state of incorporation-has become powerless to
control "its" multinationals; it is hard even to identify to which country
multinationals "belong."" On a practical level this situation has led to
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
INVESTMENT

See supra note 142-43 and accompanying text.
See Harris, supra note 20, at 39-59.
Robert Reich, Who is US? 90 HARV. Bus. REV. 53, 54 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 53-54.
FOREIGN DIRECT
EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
IN THE UNITED STATES 86-93 (3d ed. 1995); Reich, supra note 170. But
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attempts by home states to control the behavior of multinationals abroad
in areas as diverse as trading with the enemy, antitrust, corruption and
others, with varying success."' The most recent development in this
regard is "inversion" transactions, in which the management changes
the country of incorporation of a multinational's parent corporation. 7 1
These transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they
have corporate governance implications as well.' 7 1 Specifically, the
artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain when management can
pick weak countries like Bermuda as the country of incorporation for
the parent of a multinational.
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as
shareholders now tend to come from many countries. One implication
of this has been that the securities laws of the weakest country tend to
dominate because of cross-country price arbitrage. '7 Another
implication is academic proposals to let management choose the country
of securities law as well as the country of incorporation. 7 1 On a
practical level, globalization has led the SEC to relax requirements for
some foreign issuers. ' This trend has tended to weaken the
applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where
these trends will lead, but at the moment they appear once more to
favor the real entity view.

see Laura D'Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still
Matters, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1991, at 37-38.
174. See RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE HURRICANE'S EYE: THE TROUBLED
PROSPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 30-51 (1998); see also PETER T.
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 114-17, 385 (2d ed. 2007);
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of MultinationalEnterprises:An Essay on
Comity, Extraterritoriality,and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 16-20
(2003) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, NationalRegulation]; Blumberg, supra note 56, at 169.
175.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven's Sake: Reflections on Inversion
Transactions, 95 TAx NOTES 1793, 1793-94 (2002) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, For
Haven's Sake].
176. Id. at 1794. For the congressional response, see I.R.C. § 7874 (2005).
177. See Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: InternationalSecurities
Regulation in a World of Interacting SecuritiesMarkets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 63137 (1998).
178. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903,
907, 947-48 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2362 (1998). But see Merritt B. Fox,
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1338 (1999).
179. See Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S.
DisclosureRules in a GlobalizingMarket for Securities, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 707,
709-11 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 1031 2010

1032

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
E. Summary

Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same
pattern recurs. As the relationship of the corporation to the state, to
society and to its members or shareholders changes, all three views of
the corporation emerge, submerge and then re-emerge in slightly
different but fundamentally similar forms. In the end, however, the real
entity view prevails.
Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no doubt due in part
to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate
management, because it shields management from undue interference
from both shareholders and the state. Corporate management wields
political power and it influences the outcome of the debate; judges
again and again refer to the importance of corporations, by which they
mean corporate management. But the very fact that corporate
management wields this power shows that there is another reason why
the real entity view prevails: it fits reality much more than the other
two. In some periods (e.g., the Roman Empire or eighteenth century
Europe) the power of the state was overwhelming, and the artificial
entity view seemed plausible. In other periods (the medieval
membership corporation or the nineteenth century close corporation),
the aggregate view seemed plausible. But for a majority of the time,
equating the corporation either with the state or with shareholders must
have seemed to most non-academics highly implausible."' The real
180. The real entity view is clearly the dominant one in sociology and some
branches of economics. As one sociologist has stated, "[t]he recurrent problem in
sociology is to conceive of corporate organization, and to study it, in ways that do not
anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the behavior of individuals or of human
aggregates." Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of Sociology, 192 SCIENCE 665, 666 (1976).
A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study of organizations, and there
are numerous books devoted to the topic. Most of these books revolve around the study
of large corporations, since these are the dominant forms of organization in this society.
See, e.g., THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY pt. 2, sec. C (Neil J. Smelser &
Richard Swedberg eds., 1994); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); JEFFREY PFEFFER &
GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE
DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1978); W. RICHARD ScoTT,
ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (5th ed. 2003); JAMES D.
THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES OF ADMINISTRATIVE

THEORY (Transaction Publishers 2003) (1967). Moreover, they are informed by the
economic perspective inaugurated by Ronald Coase in his classic "Nature of the Firm"
article from 1937 and developed by Oliver Williamson and others into transaction cost
economics. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra, at 77. For a critique of
Williamson's theory see Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985). This branch of economics,
which now forms part of the "new institutional economics," begins by recognizing that

HeinOnline -- 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 1032 2010

2010:999

Citizens United and the CorporateForm

1033

entity view prevailed because it was more realthan the others. And this
observation enables us to move from the historical to the contemporary
and ask how Citizens United and its antecedents fit the historical
pattern.
II. CITIZENS UNITED: A REAL ENTITY CASE
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether
corporations had a right to engage in political speech under the First

Amendment in FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,' 1 decided in

1978.182 Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute that prohibited banks
and business corporations from expending funds on advertising to
influence the result of political referenda.18 1 In the context of a
referendum to introduce progressive taxation on individuals, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the law was
constitutional because the First Amendment rights of corporations are
limited to issues that "materially affect its business, property, or
assets.""
The Supreme Court reversed.' 85 The three opinions in the case
reflect the three theories of the corporation. Justice Powell, for a five
Justice majority, adopted the real entity view, stating
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is
the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.'
The majority thus treated corporations as equivalent to individuals,
citing Santa Clarafor the proposition that corporations are persons for
the firm is fundamentally different from the market because of its hierarchical structure,
and proceeds to investigate when operating as a firm as opposed to buying in the market
makes sense (the "make or buy" issue). Transaction cost economics has become the
leading explanation for the most recent transformation of the corporation-the rise of
multinational enterprises. See generally THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM
(Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden, eds., 1991).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Id. at 765.
Id. at 767-68.
Id.at 767, 769.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 777.
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Fourteenth Amendment purposes and therefore protected by the First
Amendment (as applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states).' It explicitly rejected the artificial entity theory advanced by
Massachusetts ("corporations, as creatures of the State, have only those
rights granted them by the State"),' 8 because the national banks that
brought the case were "creatures of federal law . . . and their existence

is in no way dependent on state law."' 89 The majority also explicitly
rejected the aggregate view that the intent of the statute was to protect
shareholders from management expressing different views than their
own, stating that the normal "procedures of corporate democracy" are
sufficient to protect them. *
The heart of Justice Powell's opinion lies in his concern that
upholding the Massachusetts statute would infringe on corporate
activities that he viewed as beneficial, but unrelated to corporate
business operations. He stated: "Thus corporate activities that are
widely viewed as educational and socially constructive could be
prohibited. Corporations no longer would be able safely to support-by
contributions or public service advertising-educational, charitable,
cultural, or even human rights causes."'" And Justice Powell rejected
as unsupported by the record the view that "corporations are wealthy
and powerful and their views may drown out other points of view.""
This also reflects the real entity view because corporations are judged
as standing on their own, not as reflecting the views of shareholders or
as creatures of the state. The aggregate view, as reflected in Milton
Friedman's writings from the same period, would object to the same
kind of "corporate social responsibility" considerations as not being in
the shareholders' interests. 93
Justice White's dissent, on the other hand, advanced the aggregate
view. He argued
There is now little doubt that corporate communications
come within the scope of the First Amendment. This,
however, is merely the starting point of analysis, because an
examination of the First Amendment values that corporate
expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free
society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible

187.
188.
189.

Id. at 780 & n.15.
Id. at 778-79 & n.14.
Id.

190.

Id. at 794.

191.
192.

Id. at 782 n.18.
Id. at 789.

193. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33.
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with communications emanating from individuals and is
subject to restrictions which individual expression is not....
Shareholders in [for-profit corporate] entities do not share a
common set of political or social views, and they certainly
have not invested their money for the purpose of advancing
political or social causes or in an enterprise engaged in the
business of disseminating news and opinion. . . .
Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are
united by a desire to make money, for the value of their
investment to increase. Since even communications which
have no purpose other than that of enriching the
communicator have some First Amendment protection,
activities such as advertising and other communications
integrally related to the operation of the corporation's
business may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires
of individual shareholders. This unanimity of purpose breaks
down, however, when corporations make expenditures or
undertake activities designed to influence the opinion or votes
of the general public on political and social issues that have no
material connection with or effect upon their business,
property, or assets. Although it is arguable that corporations
make such expenditures because their managers believe that it
is in the corporations' economic interest to do so, there is no
basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are
expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders
whose convictions on many political issues are undoubtedly
shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse any
electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase
the value of a particular corporate investment. This is
particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of
the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to
demonstrate that the issue involved has any material
connection with the corporate business. Thus when a
profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate
this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of
its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as
individuals would.194
This is clearly an aggregate view, and it is congruent with the
position taken by Justice White in MITE four years later. 95 The
emphasis is entirely on the shareholders, not on the corporation itself.

194.
195.

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See supraPart I.C.
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Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented from an artificial
entity perspective. He stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment
does protect corporations, there are limits to such protection because
the corporation is a creature of the state.' 96 Citing Dartmouth College,
he stated:
The appellants herein either were created by the
Commonwealth or were admitted into the Commonwealth
only for the limited purposes described in their charters and
regulated by state law. Since it cannot be disputed that the
mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the
liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our inquiry must seek

to determine which constitutional protections are "incidental
to its very existence.""
There can be little doubt that when a State creates a
corporation with the power to acquire and utilize property, it
necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the corporation will
not be deprived of that property absent due process of law.
Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose
of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the
corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to
the conduct of its business. . . . Although the Court has never

explicitly recognized a corporation's right of commercial
speech, such a right might be considered necessarily
incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.
It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of
political expression is equally necessary to carry out the
functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.
A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of
potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its
efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be
concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic
sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.
Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political
expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes
for which States permit commercial corporations to exist. So
long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal
Governments remain open to protect the corporation's interest
in its property, it has no need, though it may have the desire,
to petition the political branches for similar protection.
Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation
196. Bellotd, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Trs.
of Darmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 463, 489 (1819)).
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would use its economic power to obtain further benefits
beyond those already bestowed. I would think that any
particular form of organization upon which the State confers
special privileges or immunities different from those of
natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether
the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade
association, or a corporation.
I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a
corporation to engage in political activity with regard to
matters having no material effect on its business is necessarily
incidental to the purposes for which the Commonwealth
permitted these corporations to be organized or admitted
within its boundaries. Nor can I disagree with the Supreme
Judicial Court's factual finding that no such effect has been
shown by these appellants. Because the statute as construed
provides at least as much protection as the Fourteenth
Amendment requires, I believe it is constitutionally valid.198
The positions taken by Justices Rehnquist and White clearly reflect
the artificial entity and aggregate views. But the majority taking the real
entity view prevailed, presumably because in 1978 it was hard to view
corporations as a mere aggregation of their shareholders or as mere
creatures of the state. Surprisingly, the majority opinion was written by
Justice Powell, who, as we have seen, took an artificial entity view in
MITE and CTS.'" The explanation is that the hostile takeover
movement threatened the same educational and charitable activities of
corporations that Powell sought to defend in Bellotti, so in that context
he needed to empower the state to save "its" corporations.
The emphasis on the artificial entity view in CTS may also have
influenced the result in the Court's next First Amendment case related
to corporations, Austhn v. Micligan State Chamber of Commerce,200
decided three years after CTS.20' The issue in Austhi was whether a
state could ban corporate-direct expenditures in support of or in
opposition to candidates for state office, as opposed to expenditures
through "Political Action Committees" (PACs) organized for this
purpose.2 02 Justice Marshall, for a six Justice majority that included
198. Id. at 824-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Rehnquist
rejected the argument that some of the corporations were not chartered by
Massachusetts by pointing out that they were all permitted to do business there. Id. at
824 n.2.
199. See supra Part I.C.

200.
201.

494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id.

202.

Id. at 654-55.
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Rehnquist and White, held that the ban was constitutional. 20 3 The
majority opinion reflects the artificial entity view held by Rehnquist:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as
limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the
accumulation and distribution of assets-that enhance their
ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways
that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments.
These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to
play a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but also permit
them to use "resources amassed in the economic marketplace"
to obtain "an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace." . . . the political advantage of corporations is

unfair because
"[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation
. . . are not an indication of popular support for the

corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and
customers. The availability of these resources may make
a corporation a formidable political presence, even
though the power of the corporation may be no reflection
of the power of its ideas. "204
We therefore have recognized that "the compelling
governmental interest in preventing corruption support[s] the
restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled
through the corporate form." 20
The Chamber argues that this concern about corporate
domination of the political process is insufficient to justify a
restriction on independent expenditures. Although this Court
has distinguished these expenditures from direct contributions
in the context of federal laws regulating individual donors, it
has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a
danger of real or apparent corruption posed by such
expenditures when made by corporations to influence
candidate elections . . . . Michigan's regulation aims at a

different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
203.
204.

Id. at 668.
Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted) (quoting FEC v. Mass. Ciiens for Life,

Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1986)).
205.

Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat'I Conservadve Politial Acdon Comm.,

470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985)).
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wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas.

. . . We

emphasize that the mere fact that corporations may
accumulate large amounts of wealth is not the justification for
§ 54; rather, the unique state-conferred corporate structure
that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the
limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the
guise of political contributions. We therefore hold that the
State has articulated a sufficiently compelling rationale to
support its restriction on independent expenditures by
corporations.206
Why did the majority emphasize the artificial entity view? It may
have been influenced by the adoption of that view in CTS. However, it
is more likely that what really bothered Justice Marshall was "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth"207
per se, but he could not take that position because it was rejected as to
rich individuals by Buckley v. Valeo.208 In his dissent, Justice Scalia
pointed out the weakness of the majority's position, stating that while
the state charters corporations, "[i]t is rudimentary that the State cannot
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First
Amendment rights," 2" and that the aggregation of wealth argument is
inconsistent with Buckley.210 Justice Brennan also felt that the majority
was on weak ground, and in his concurrence took the aggregate view
that the purpose of the statute is to protect dissenting shareholders.2 11
Justice Kennedy in his dissent rejected both the aggregate and the
artificial entity views, relying on Bellotti to argue (in accordance with
the real entity view) that corporations are equal to individuals, and
therefore their speech must be protected.2 12

206. Id. at 659-61 (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 660.
208. This rejection was explicitly recognized by Justice Stevens in Davis v.
FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 & n.1 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
209. 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.
of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Speiser v.

Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
210. 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 674-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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We thus arrive at the most recent addition to the Supreme Court's

jurisprudence on the corporate form, Citzens United v. FEC.2 13 The
question presented in that case was whether Congress could impose the
same kind of limits on corporations that Michigan state law applied in
Austin.2 14 The Court could have ruled narrowly that the limits were
unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit corporation formed for
advocacy purposes by individuals, but decided instead to use the case as
the foundation for a much broader ruling that all corporate direct
expenditures are permitted under the First Amendment, overruling
Austin. 215
What is remarkable about Citizens United, although maybe not
surprising to the reader at this point, is that both the majority and the
dissent adopted the real entity view of the corporation, so that their
only disagreement was in divergent assessments of the implications for
the First Amendment. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy
emphasized, for example, that the ban on corporate speech was not
alleviated by the fact that a PAC organized and controlled by the same
corporation could speak freely because "[a] PAC is a separate
association from the corporation."2 16 This assertion can only be made
under the real entity view because under the aggregate view both the
corporation and the PAC are owned by the same ultimate shareholders,
and under the artificial entity view both the PAC and the corporation
are created by the same state.
The majority relies on Bellotti for the proposition that "the First
Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a
speaker's corporate identity. "217 It rejects the "antidistortion" rationale
of Austin as overbroad and inconsistent with Buckley, and as permitting
the government to ban speech by media corporations. 218 The aggregate
view advanced by the Solicitor General and by Justice Brennan in his
concurrence in Austin is likewise rejected in reliance on the
"procedures of corporate democracy" of Bellotti.2 19 Interestingly, the
majority does not even mention the artificial entity view, even though it
(and not the antidistortion rationale per se) was key to the holding in
Austin. While the statute at issue is a federal one, and corporations are
chartered by states, it could be argued that the federal government also

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
(1978)).
218.
219.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2008).
Id. at 886.
Id. at 892, 913.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 903 (citing First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
Id. at 904-05, 911.
Id. at 911 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
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confers benefits on business corporations by protecting the market that
enables them to engage in business.220
Justice Scalia, in concurrence, did admit that the First Amendment
was originally intended to apply to individuals, "[b]ut the individual
person's right to speak includes the right to speak in association with
other individual persons.""' But this does not mean that he adopted the
aggregate view, since that view, as applied to the shareholders,
underlays the principal argument of the Government and was soundly
rejected by the majority.222 Instead, what Scalia meant was presumably
corporate management working together as an association of persons
"to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal
agents of the modem free economy. We should celebrate rather than
condemn the addition of this speech to the public debate." 223
Nor does the dissent attempt in Citizens United to advance any
view other than the real entity view. Instead, it emphasizes that
corporations are different than natural persons and therefore may be
more heavily regulated:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction
between corporate and human speakers is significant.
Although they make enormous contributions to our society,
corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote
or run for office. Because they may be managed and
controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in
fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The
financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental
orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about
their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a
compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty,
to take measures designed to guard against the potentially
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national
races. 224
This is all about the corporation itself, not about the shareholders
or the state. Similarly:

220. This argument was made to justify a federal tax on state-chartered
corporations as early as 1909. See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, supra note 78, at 1218;
see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
221.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted).
222. Id. at 928-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The same logic applies to this case with additional force
because it is the identity of corporations, rather than
individuals, that the Legislature has taken into account. As we
have unanimously observed, legislatures are entitled to decide
"that the special characteristics of the corporate structure
require particularly careful regulation" in an electoral context
. . . . Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate
identity tend to be less worrisome, in other words, because
the "speakers" are not natural persons, much less members of
our political community, and the governmental interests are of
the highest order. Furthermore, when corporations, as a class,
are distinguished from noncorporations, as a class, there is a
lesser risk that regulatory distinctions will reflect invidious
discrimination or political favoritism.22
Not a word is written here on the corporation's relationship to the
state or to the shareholders. The artificial entity theory is discussed
later in the dissent, but purely in a historical context: when explaining
the Framers' view of corporations, Justice Stevens emphasized their
relationship to the state.226 But he emphasized that this was a historical
artifact that disappeared with general incorporation statutes, and that
"many legal scholars have long since rejected the concession theory of
the corporation."22 7 He mentioned briefly the artificial entity rationale
for Austin, but did not emphasize it in comparison with corporate
power.22 8
The dissent also addressed the aggregate theory at the very end
when discussing the dissenting shareholder rationale of Brennan's
concurrence in Austin, but only as a limited and secondary argument
"beyond the distinctive legal attributes of the corporate form." 229 The
main emphasis in this section of the dissent was on the weakness of the
"procedures of corporate democracy." 23 0 This is very far from viewing

225. Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted) (quoting FEC v. Nat'lRight to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)).
226. Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Corporations were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public
entities . . .

").

227.
Id. at 949-50, 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228.
Id. at 956 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229.
Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85
VA. L. REv. 247, 320 (1999)) (voting and shareholder derivative suits are "so limited
as to be almost nonexistent" and selling the stock faces many practical difficulties).
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the corporation as a mere "nexus of contracts" with the primary
contract being that with the shareholders. 23 1
The entire Citizens United decision, encompassing both the
majority and the dissent, is thus reflective of the real entity view.
Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that
created them and the shareholders that own them. The debate between
the majority and the dissent is about what follows from this perspective
on corporations. In the majority's opinion, this means that corporations
are speakers just like individuals and entitled to the same First
Amendment protection, while the dissent takes the view that because of
the special characteristics of corporations, they have more limited First
Amendment rights. 232 The dissent remarks:
The fact that corporations are different from human
beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the
majority opinion almost completely elides it. Austin set forth
some of the basic differences. Unlike natural persons,
corporations have "limited liability" for their owners and
managers, "perpetual life," separation of ownership and
control, "and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract

capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize
the return on their shareholders' investments." 233 Unlike
voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign
controlled. Unlike other interest groups, business corporations
have been "effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring
society's economic welfare"2 34 ; they inescapably structure the
life of every citizen. "'[T]he resources in the treasury of a
business corporation,"' furthermore, "'are not an indication
of popular support for the corporation's political ideas.' "235
"'They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of
investors and customers. The availability of these resources

231.
See Fischel, supra note 142, at 1273 ("A corporation . . . is nothing more
than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various
individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit.").
232.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
233. Id. at 971 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Austin v. Mich. Chamberof Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990)).
234. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Milton
C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT 289, 302 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998)).
235. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin,
494 U.S. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258
(1986))).
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may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even
though the power of the2 36corporation may be no reflection of

the power of its ideas."'

It might also be added that corporations have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.
Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of
human beings, to be sure, and their "personhood" often
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of "We the People" by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established.237
It is an interesting question "who" is even speaking when
a business corporation places an advertisement that endorses
or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the
customers or employees, who typically have no say in such
matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders,
who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of
the firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to
management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the
corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking,
except their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from
using corporate funds for personal ends. Some individuals
associated with the corporation must make the decision to
place the ad, but the idea that these individuals are thereby
fostering their self-expression or cultivating their critical
faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible that the
corporation's electoral message will conflict with their
personal convictions. Take away the ability to use general
treasury funds for some of those ads, and no one's autonomy,
dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in the
least.238
It is hard to imagine a more forceful statement of the real entity
view: actual human beings disappear almost completely. In a footnote,
Justice Stevens does acknowledge the existence of other theories of the
corporation, but it is clear which theory he favors. 239 The artificial
236. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Austin,
494 U.S. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258

(1986))).
237.
238.

Id. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Justice Stevens writes:
Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is
conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and
implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other
239.
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entity theory advanced by Justice Rehnquist in Bellotti, and relied upon
by the majority in Austin, and the aggregate theory advanced by Justice
White in Bellotti and Justice Brennan in Austin have almost
disappeared, and both the majority and the dissent take the real entity
view. Like so many times before, the real entity view reigns supreme
once again.
CONCLUSION: WHAT'S NEXT?
As the reader can expect by now, it is hardly likely that this state
of affairs will remain stable forever. When the next transformation in
the status of corporations is addressed by the Court, it is inevitable that
the artificial entity and aggregate theories of the corporation will reemerge to once again contend with the real entity view. In fact, one can
see this process germinating even now within Citizens United.
An important rhetorical comment made by Justice Stevens in his
dissent, and echoed by other critics of the decision (like President
Obama in the State of the Union address),24 is its impact on the rules
restricting foreigners from participating in U.S. elections. Justice
Stevens stated that the majority's approach "would appear to afford the
same protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners
as to individual Americans." 24 ' This drew a strong disclaimer from the
majority, arguing that even if the Government has a compelling interest
in limiting foreign influence over our political process, the corporate
expenditure ban is overbroad because it "is not limited to corporations
or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded
predominantly by foreign shareholders."242
Predictably, Congress will react by reaffirming that the ban on
contributions and expenditures made by foreign nationals applies to

recognized model. Austin referred to the structure and the advantages of
corporations as "state-conferred" in several places, but its antidistortion
argument relied on only the basic descriptive features of corporations, as
sketched above. It is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the
corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural persons in
fundamental ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate
them differently if it is human welfare that is the object of it concern.
Id. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 665, 667).
240. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) in
156 CONG. REc. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) ("[L]ast week, the Supreme Court
reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interestsincluding foreign corporations-to spend without limit in our elections.").
241.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 911.

HeinOnline -- 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 1045 2010

1046

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

foreign corporations .243 But how will Congress define what is a foreign
corporation?
The majority in Citizens United envisaged two possibilities. One
was to define foreign corporation as a corporation created by a foreign
state. 2" This approach is one taken by our tax laws, and it follows the
artificial entity view.245 The problem, of course, would be that if this
were the only definition, it would be too easy for foreigners to become
Americans merely by incorporating a shell in one of the states.
The other approach mentioned by the majority was to take the
aggregate view and look at the identity of the shareholders, so that a
corporation the majority of whose shareholders are U.S. citizens will
count as American and others as foreign. 2" This may work for closely
held corporations. For example, this approach is used in determining
foreignness for purposes of the rules restricting foreign ownership of
media and transportation corporations.24 7 But for publicly traded
multinational enterprises, the aggregate view is very difficult to
maintain because the shares trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership
is constantly shifting, and most of the owners trade under "street
names" that make it very hard even for the IRS to know their true
identities. Thus, I predict that the same reasons that forced the Court to
abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction will apply in this
context as well.
A third possibility would be to take the real entity view and
confront directly the question of whether corporations in a globalized
world have a meaningful nationality. As discussed above this issue is
extensively debated and reasonable minds can differ.2 48 It lies at the
heart of the current transformation of the corporate form from mainly
national to multinational enterprises that do not owe any particular
allegiance to any state.
243. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(e)(2006). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced by Sen.
Schumer and Rep. Van Hollen, defines a foreign corporation as any corporation
incorporated overseas or any domestic corporation that is either 20 percent owned or de
facto controlled by foreign nationals, which is a combination of all three views. See
H.R. 5175, S. 3295 (111th Cong. Sess. 2), § 102.
244. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
245. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5), (30) (2006). But see I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)
(defining some foreign corporations as domestic based on the identity of their
shareholders).
246. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
See Gregory P. Cirillo & Christopher M. Mills, FederalRestictions on
247.
Foreign Particioationin Commercial Aviation and Related Fields, in 2 MANUAL OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 11-13 (J. Eugene Marans et al., eds.,
3d ed. 2004); Christina H. Burrow et al., Foreign Investment in the United States
Communications Industry, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra, at 164.
See Reich, supra note 170, at 53-54; Tyson, supra note 172, at 37-38.
248.
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Whatever the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is already possible
to predict that once again the real entity definition of the nationality of
corporations, which focuses on where they are "managed and
controlled," will triumph over a narrow focus on the creating state, too
remote and manipulable, and the shareholders, too remote and
diffused." 9 To be continued...

249. "Managed and controlled" is a familiar definition of corporate residency
from the tax laws of many countries, relying on a U.K. House of Lords decision from
the nineteenth century. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
TAX LAW (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 195-96) (on file with author). Justice
Stevens seems to take this view because he speaks of corporations "managed and
controlled" by foreigners. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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